Abstract. Recent studies have highlighted the instrumental use of language, wherein actors deploy claims to strategically pursue policy goals in the absence of persuasion or socialization. Yet these accounts are insufficiently attentive to the social context in which an audience assesses and responds to strategic appeals. I present a theoretical account that highlights the distinctly powerful role of international law in framing strategic argumentation. Legalized discourses are especially legitimate because law is premised on a set of internally coherent practices that constitute actors and forms of action. I then illustrate the implications in a hard case concerning US efforts to secure immunities from International Criminal Court jurisdiction. Contrary to realist accounts of law as a tool of the powerful, I show that both pro-and anti-ICC diplomacy was channelled through a legal lens that imposed substantial constraints on the pursuit of policy objectives. Court proponents responded to US diplomatic pressure with their own legal arguments; this narrowed the scope of the exemptions, even as the Security Council temporarily conceded to US demands. While the US sought to marry coercion with argumentative appeals, it failed to generate a lasting change in global practice concerning ICC jurisdiction.
Introduction
The field of International Relations has become increasingly occupied with the role of language in world politics. Important contributions by rationalist scholars emphasizing the calculated deployment of rhetoric 2 and communicative accounts that highlight the truth-seeking and consensus-building purpose of argumentation 3 have sought to clarify the various logics and effects of speech acts. This article further attends to this discussion through a focused investigation of the role of legal rhetoric in international diplomacy. To do so, it proposes a theoretical conception of strategic argumentation through law. Following recent studies, 4 I
contend that many international debates can be conceptualized as strategic interactions, wherein actors deploy various claims in an attempt to compel other participants to accept their proposed policy. This account does not assume that actors enter into debates with the expectation of altering their own underlying preferences, or that successful outcomes require such change in others. While participants would prefer to persuade their interlocutors to change their views and endorse a given approach (since this would result in a more stable outcome), they are content in the short term to use reasoned arguments to shift the political terrain such that competing claims-and the attendant policies-are no longer regarded as politically advantageous. In this case, it is not necessary for all actors to genuinely agree with the stated policy, but simply to be given sufficient grounds on which to concede the point and adapt their behaviour to meet the other side's demands. This account is therefore sensitive to the methodological challenges inherent in studying cognitive changes that underpin accounts of persuasion.
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Yet even the self-interested employment of rhetoric requires an audience to assess and respond to competing claims and in this way, my account shares assumptions from the constructivist literature concerning the intersubjective basis for effective arguing. 6 Actors seeking to generate acceptance, if not genuine endorsement, of their views cannot employ just any claim at random, but must instead frame their arguments within recognized boundaries.
Hence, even strategic argumentation, and the tactical concessions it seeks to compel, is rooted in shared understandings that provide a framework for determining the more compelling claim. The social setting in which rhetorical contestation occurs thus provides structural constraints that limit the range of claims that will be considered acceptable to the wider audience.
Accounts of rhetorical action and coercion have acknowledged the necessary role of audience dynamics, but have left the description of its substance underdeveloped. Elaborating on recent constructivist accounts, I contend that the social structure of international law provides the basis for a shared environment in which strategic argumentation may take place. 7 Law is defined by an internal logic of justification based in precedent that constitutes actors and appropriate forms of action. When actors argue via legal means they seek to validate particular behaviours or policies as conforming to, or violating, established principles, rules and norms that are bound up in the practice of legality. These can be distinguished from, and are intersubjectively recognized as superior to, more politicized forms of rhetoric that explicitly invoke self-interest to the general exclusion of principled justifications. 8 In sum, strategic argumentation seeks to gain acceptance for a particular policy goal from other relevant actors by invoking claims that are mutually comprehensible. Legal arguments are especially powerful in such contests because they are connected to the social construction of international society, and therefore represent an especially legitimate source of justification.
This account of strategic legal argumentation has two specific implications. First, in multilateral settings actors will tend to invoke justifications based in legal principles, norms and rules-potentially in conjunction with coercive efforts-in pursuing policy goals. This strategy is preferable even when the actor making a claim does not fully endorse the standards it employs.
Yet due to the particular discursive structure and authority of international law, even the cynical invocation of law can impose important limitations on freedom of action, by narrowing the scope of future argumentation and making actions subject to retrospective assessment on the basis of these prior claims. States may then become rhetorically entrapped and face politically consequential challenges linked to factual disputes (challenges regarding their interpretation of the law) or claims of hypocrisy (not upholding their purported commitments). Under these circumstances, resistance from the target audience can increase the costs of a proposed policy leading to its abandonment. 9 Second, legal discourses provide a reservoir of meaning which less materially powerful actors can exploit to challenge dominant states and promote their own policy goals. Arguing via law entails a transformation of power into a social commodity wherein material capabilities are wedded to, and altered by, forms of legitimating power to produce outcomes. 10 This account therefore challenges realist conceptions of law in which preponderantly powerful states merely use legal institutions to pursue their own self-interested goals while remaining essentially immune from legal constraints not to their liking.
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I illustrate these theoretical claims with close attention to a series of diplomatic efforts by the United States to challenge the scope of International Criminal Court (ICC) jurisdiction at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). From its inception, the ICC was the subject of a wideranging and aggressive US campaign to secure special exemptions from the ICC's criminal accountability regime. Proponents of an independent Court sought to resist US demands without recourse to parallel threats or incentives, but instead through the force of argument. On its face, this latter strategy would appear unpromising, as prominent theories of International Relations hold that preponderantly powerful actors will leverage their military and economic advantages to assert their will in the international system. Indeed, given the degree of its opposition, the ICC Despite these apparent impediments, pro-and anti-ICC diplomacy was channelled through a legal lens that imposed substantial constraints on the pursuit of policy objectives. Both the ICC's most prominent detractor and its proponents employed a variety of claims concerning specific ICC rules and broader principles of international law in support of their preferred interpretation of the Court's prospective jurisdiction over nationals of non-party states. While the US retained forms of coercion, they were tempered by a rhetorical strategy that sought to justify American policy within the specific parameters of international legal practice and the rules of an institution it openly rejected. Yet the decision to pursue a legal mode of justification exposed US claims to unfavourable assessment as both factually incorrect and hypocritical. In the face of sustained pressure, ICC parties were able to assemble an alternative narrative that joined technical legal interpretations with a set of claims concerning the appropriate conduct within the international legal order. In the short term this had the effect of substantially narrowing the scope of the special exemptions, even as the Security Council temporarily conceded to US demands. In the longer term, however, the US position proved socially unsustainable. The United States was therefore unable to leverage its superior political, military and economic capabilities to generate a lasting acceptance of its claim to ICC immunities.
My most fundamental contention, therefore, is that the invocation of legal claims tempers and constrains the use of coercive tactics such that the deployment of material power resources has different-and more modest-effects than it would in a non-argumentative and especially non-legal setting. Indeed, US actions have paradoxically reinforced the ICC through a process of legal claim making that was intended to do the exact reverse. Hence the US pursuit of its interests had unintended consequences precisely due to the way in which international social meaning is generated via legal argumentation. In this way, the present article takes up Brunnée and Toope's call for scholars to "focus more attention on empirical studies that illustrate the distinctiveness of law… and that explore how that distinctiveness plays out in specific contexts and issue areas." 12 In so doing, the article makes two principal theoretical contributions. On the one hand, it furthers the integration of instrumental and norm-based logics, by showing how the strategic use of principled arguments interacts with material forces to affect policy outcomes. On the other hand, it attends to an ongoing debate among International Relations and International Law scholars, by providing further evidence regarding the means through which international law serves as a source of legitimate authority in real-world settings. 13 Finally, the article provides empirical detail to uncover the practical consequences of diplomacy-and the status of a key feature of the ICC's legal regime-under conditions of great power resistance.
Strategic Action, Audiences and Argumentation in World Politics
Defining Strategic Argumentation The present account thus shares the assumption of communicative action that the valorization of reasoned claims leads to a diminishment of material power resources that characterize bargaining and coercion. 17 And while argumentation assumes that all aspects of discourse are open to contestation, the ability to advance claims, and respond to those proposed by others, requires at least some minimum degree of stability in the underlying social structure. The meaning of social norms and legal rules is never fully solidified, though to the extent that they bear upon actors at a particular moment in time, institutions may be studied as effectively fixed entities. 20 In my account, the deployment of strategic argumentation can lead actors to become rhetorically entrapped by a more effective alternative frame, and concede to the will of their opponent by dropping the argument and revising their behaviour accordingly.
Regardless of the motivations, therefore, the credibility and consistency of claims bears upon their reception and the perceived legitimacy of associated policies.
Audience Dynamics and the Impact of Claims
Diplomacy takes place via justificatory discourse, and in this way implicates some audience of other actors in the deployment and reception of claims. This is made explicit in accounts of communicative action, but strategic environments are also underpinned by a social setting in which rhetorical contests can be adjudicated. of this community inform-but do not strictly determine-the self-interested pursuit of policy goals. 21 More specifically, since meanings in the international system cannot be imposed unilaterally, models of rhetorical action presume that target subjects must accept or reject the proposed arguments. 22 As a practical matter, therefore, actors must be attentive to the content of their claims, and seek to tie their particular appeals to widely recognized community standards since this will increase the chances of their argument being accepted. Collectively held views concerning the appropriateness of certain discourses and behaviours thus strongly condition and constrain the type of claims that actors may make in legitimating their policies. 
Strategic Argumentation Through International Law
The assertion that international law serves as a primary source of legitimate authority in the international system is not novel, as legal scholars have long recognized. 25 However, international law as a field academic inquiry has tended to emphasize the formal doctrinal sources of law and has consequently been less inclined to reflect on the social origins of the legitimacy-and hence obligatory status-that law is said to command. 26 Despite extensive efforts at bridge building, IR scholars have been slow to capitalize on these insights. 27 Law is understood to be distinct from-yet related to-other ideational phenomena like social norms or moral values and material forces like military or economic capacity. Yet the relationship to the substantive context of argumentation, and hence the particular difference that legal discourses are expected to make in comparison to other forms of agency, is often under-specified. source of authority in the international system because law is intimately bound up in the social construction of international actors and acceptable forms of action. The structure of legal reasoning thus provides the necessary shared expectations that underpin both communicative/deliberative and strategic/instrumental forms of arguing.
The Social Structure of International Law as a Reservoir of Legitimacy
Constructivist IR theory has made significant contributions in conceptualizing international law as part of a multifaceted social system. In this account, law is not defined by a by a strictly enumerated set of binding rules backed by sanctions-as per rationalist "hard law" approaches 30 -but rather encompasses a particular mode of practice based in precedent that generates categories of meaning and more specific permissive and prohibitionary standards.
International law's essence is rooted in a principled justificatory discourse that channels present debates over the meaning and scope of law through reference to previously articulated rules and procedures. 31 In so doing, actors engage in a continual process of making and evaluating claims concerning the prescriptive and proscriptive status of law. These associated repertoires of ideas, behaviours and language comprise the intersubjective practices that structure international legal action, and aggregate over time as precedents that increasingly bind participants to positions.
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The development and enactment of international law is thus intimately associated with the social construction of international actors and the definition of acceptable and unacceptable forms of action. A central insight of recent constructivist work is that "legal practices are embedded within, and constituted by, layers of nested social understandings." 33 The authoritative nature of law is derived from its connection to fundamental normative structures that act as ordering principles to demarcate the constituent units of the system and structure subsequent efforts to develop frameworks for appropriate conduct. In the contemporary international system, conceptions of territorially based sovereign statehood, contractual international law, the sanctity of commitments (pacta sunt servanda) and multilateral diplomacy operate both as a precondition for mutual recognition and foundational rules of the game through which actors pursue their policy goals. 34 In turn, they provide the impetus for the development of particular normative systems that constitute the features of "responsible" statehood-defining acceptable behaviour in issues such as the conduct of warfare, the nature of human rights and proper representation in political communities-that may be further articulated as more precise norms and rules. 
Strategic Legal Argumentation and Its Consequences
While commonly associated with forms of deliberation, the above account is also compatible with the strategic assumptions adopted in this article. An actor will seek to gain support for-or at least acquiescence to-its policy by reference to the most compelling constellation of claims it can muster. The particular authority that international law enjoys means that actors will prefer to 40 Strategic legal argumentation proceeds via analogy, as parties attempt to justify their particular arguments by linking them to widely accepted standards operating at two different levels of generality. First, actors may invoke specific legal rules, whether found in a treaty or other source. The relative precision of legal texts may increase their impact in argumentative episodes, since they tend to permit a more limited scope for interpretation and deviation. 43 Yet reference to rules in isolation is often insufficient to provide definitive answers concerning the meaning and limits of law. For this reason, actors will typically seek to further root their claims in a second set of higher-order norms spanning an array of concerns relating to conceptions of appropriate action (e.g., ending impunity for grave crimes), status (e.g., equality under law) and the nature of legal obligation itself (e.g., voluntary consent as the basis of adopting commitments). The existence of multiple sources of authority does not eliminate interpretive dilemmas, therefore, but the structure of international law provides an agreed framework through which the pursuit of policy goals via principled arguments can take place. These factual disagreements may be further parlayed into claims of hypocrisy-in effect pointing out discrepancies between an actor's rhetoric and behaviour that undercut its purported good faith application of the law-leading to increasing social pressures to comply with the new standard. In other words, while non-parties may avoid the binding legal effect of new rules, they are never able to fully isolate themselves from these developments, and attempts to instrumentalize the law can generate unintended consequences that are difficult to control.
The core claim of this article is thus presented in the form of a counterfactual, that without the constraining effects of legal discourse, the United States would have been able to leverage its preponderant material power advantages to gain concessions that much more closely adhered to its initial demands. 45 Counterfactual analysis is an especially useful means of 44 Deitelhoff and Müller, 'Theoretical Paradise -Empirically Lost?', p. 170-171; Johnstone, The Power of Deliberation, pp. 6-7; Risse, '"Let's Argue!"', pp. 21-22. 45 I thank one of the anonymous reviewers for encouraging me to develop this point more explicitly, and for suggesting this framing of the counterfactual.
these scenarios, however, attention must be paid to selecting theoretically and logically coherent possibilities: the more closely proposed counterfactuals follow the actual flow of events, the greater their analytical leverage. This can be achieved by identifying critical points from which alternative historical pathways could plausibly have emerged. If strategic argumentation were operative therefore, we should expect to see public discourse increasingly coalesce around a set of specific statements relating to context-appropriate legal standards, and policy outcomes shift in favour of the more widely accepted position. This should occur largely irrespective of the distribution of material capabilities between interlocutors. By contrast, an alternative explanation emphasizing material power would expect the US to deploy forms of coercion-possibly in concert with arguments-to gain acquiescence to its policy goals without substantial concessions to its opponents. In this view, while legal rhetoric is one potential strategy a powerful state may employ, the back-and-forth of strategic claim making will not significantly alter either its goals or the outcome of the episode; more fundamental forms of power politics will always be decisive in driving international diplomacy. Hence a predominant power may invoke law as a smokescreen for its interests, but move to a legal sphere should not stop it from getting its way on its terms. 54 Yet the implications of these legal innovations are far from settled, and differing views remain concerning the extent to which a UNSC resolution would bind the Court and thereby alter the operations of an independent international organization. 55 
Security Council Politics and the Immunities Debate
To assess the dynamics of strategic legal argumentation, I focus on a series of debates in the share of the UN peacekeeping operations budget should their demands go unheeded.
Diplomacy at the Security Council must also be situated within a wider US policy of seeking global indemnity from the Court through a web of bilateral non-surrender agreements.
These agreements-in which third party states agreed not to turn US service members over to the ICC-were negotiated via threats and incentives, as US law required that military aid and economic assistance be suspended to any states that refused to conclude a non-surrender arrangement. 60 Hence, coercive tactics featured prominently in the US approach both inside and outside the Security Council, and ICC supporters faced real material costs in resisting US pressure. This generated a dilemma of whether to persist with their prior commitment to the ICC or concede to American demands, making the episode a key early test case for the US immunities strategy and the international response.
Strategic Legal Argumentation in Motion: Resolutions 1422 and 1487
The United States initially proposed language to amend the re-authorization of the UNMIBH Contributing personnel to peacekeeping efforts demonstrates a commitment to international peace and security that, as you all know, can involve hardship and danger to those involved in peacekeeping. Having accepted these risks by exposing people to dangerous and difficult situations in the service of promoting peace and stability, we will not ask them to accept the additional risk of politicized prosecutions before a court whose jurisdiction over our people the Government of the United States does not accept.
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In so doing, the US delegation only made passing reference to the prevailing legal context, highlighting immunity provisions in previous status of forces agreements and briefly asserting that Article 98 of the Rome Statute generically accommodated this practice.
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The response from other UNSC members begins to demonstrate the analytical purchase of the strategic legal argumentation frame. Rather than conceding to US coercion at this early stage, ICC proponents instead offered a counter-proposal (attributed to France) that specifically invoked Article 16 of the Rome Statute, limiting prospective deferrals of ICC investigations or prosecutions 'on a case by case basis'." While this concession could be read as an effort to reach 61 The relevant passage of the US draft proposal of 19 June 2002 reads: "Decides that persons of or from contributing states acting in connection with such operations shall enjoy in the territory of all Member States other than the contributing State immunity from arrest, detention, and prosecution with respect to all acts arising out of the operation and that this immunity shall continue after termination of their participation in the operation for all such acts." After nearuniversal opposition-owing to the fact that the language also exempted individuals from the criminal jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia-the US subsequently modified the language in a second proposed draft text of June 27 that specified the exemption applied only to "current and former officials and personnel from a contributing State not a party to the Rome Statute" and did not modify the existing legal standing of the ICTY. This episode constitutes an initial, though comparatively minor, concession since the US still sought permanent immunity for its own forces. American assertions, the proposal for granting a priori immunity expressly violated the terms of Article 16 both because it envisioned an effectively permanent exemption irrespective of an ongoing ICC legal process and because it reversed the intention that renewal be done by an affirmative vote of the Council.
[T]he proposals now circulating would have the Council, Lewis-Carroll-like, stand article 16 of the Rome Statute on its head. The negotiating history makes clear that recourse to article 16 is on a case-by-case basis only, where a particular situation-for example the dynamic of a peace negotiation-warrants a 12-month deferral. The Council should not purport to alter that fundamental provision. obligations under the Statute, and undercut the sovereign right of states to undertake binding legal commitments. The US proposal was thus portrayed as an extra-legal interference in the treaty making process, and an overreach of Security Council authority "that would destabilize and undermine the international legal regime" based on the principle of sovereign equality and the sanctity of legal agreements. 75 This, in turn, could only serve to degrade the credibility of the Security Council by further politicizing its decisions. 76 Finally, delegates attempted to leverage US support for the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia into a claim of inconsistency to further challenge the validity of the US position. They pointed out that the ICTY retained jurisdiction over all alleged crimes committed in Bosnia, so the concern regarding ICC authority was misplaced. 77 But more fundamentally, if the US was satisfied with ceding authority-including, potentially, over its own soldiers-to one supra-national court, how could it justify its virulent opposition to the ICC? This rhetorical move conveniently neglected the fact that the ICTY was created by a UNSC resolution and thus remained (though at arms length) under its purview, which was precisely why the US could countenance the Tribunal. The strategic positioning of this claim was therefore not intended to advance a reasoned process of truth-seeking leading to a convergence of views, but instead to further box the US into a socially unsustainable position. Irrespective of this deliberate oversight, charges of hypocrisy forced US representatives into further defence of their proposal that later proved consequential in limiting US policy options. The most obvious rejoinder-that the US only accepted international justice when it could control the outcomes via its Security Council veto-was politically undesirable as it was obviously unlikely to appeal to the majority of ICC supporters.
Despite the stakes and apparent vehement opposition from the majority of participating states, Resolution 1422 was approved by a unanimous vote. A sceptical reading would suggestas per the alternative explanation to this study-that international law served merely as a convenient forum for airing grievances, but did not ultimately affect the policy outcome sought by the most powerful actor. to legal arguments did not change minds, the deference to a legal framing was crucial in strategic terms as it provided other states with the minimally acceptable grounds required to justify their temporary yielding to US demands, even though the decision was motivated by other concerns.
This is the essence of the strategic account advanced here. At the same time, such discursive moves are "sticky" in the sense that once activated they are difficult to abandon, a fact that would prove highly relevant to subsequent developments.
One year later, the United States was able to secure a further one-year extension of the more generally, this suggests that the strategic invocation of legal argumentation has limited the scope of US power and thus generated outcomes that are notably different than would be expected had material power trumped principled discourse.
Rather, US efforts have arguably had the inverse-and unintended-consequence of increasing the profile of the ICC as a competent feature of the international system. As Stahn has noted, "by pushing for the adoption of Resolution 1422 (2002) the US has incidentally recognized that the jurisdiction of the ICC extends to nationals of third states." 94 This had significant repercussions, as US representatives were increasingly subject to claims of hypocrisy in allowing other non-party nationals (in Sudan and Libya) to be subject to a Court from which they themselves were exempted. Legalized argumentation has thus led to a form of rhetorical entrapment that further undermined the prospects that the global audience of states will accept the US position. Recognition of the US failure to undermine the ICC immunities regime has compounded during the Obama administration, which has signalled a more open-though not fully supportive-approach to the Court and has clearly seen no political benefit in reviving its legal contestation. This in turn demonstrates the often subtle, but politically significant, role that legal rhetoric plays in shaping state policy.
Conclusion: The Power of Legal Argumentation in World Politics
Scholars have noted the prevalence of legal discourses in international relations, yet the impact of principled interventions remains a subject of considerable debate. This article contributes to theoretical conceptions of argumentation by highlighting the distinctive structure and effects of legal claim making, and provides empirical evidence to support its account through a close attention to diplomatic practices in a particularly challenging case. As anticipated by my theory, 94 Stahn, 'The Ambiguities of Security Council Resolution 1422 (2002)', p. 94.
legal standards served as a reservoir of legitimacy for actors to exploit in debates over the ICC immunities regime. Competing claims were positioned in relation to a set of legal principles that in turn conditioned the success or failure of policy efforts: most fundamentally, the United States was unable to manoeuvre other states into accepting its terms (and abandoning their own position) because its principled claims were not regarded as sufficiently compelling. Inversely, the strategic manoeuvring by ICC proponents generated political conditions in which the immunities campaign was no longer regarded as worth the political costs. The strategic employment of legal arguments thus contributed to political outcomes by increasing the social sustainability of certain policies and consequently diminishing that of others. The resulting accommodations emerged as a response to the political environment generated by these diplomatic episodes, and without changes in underlying beliefs.
This account does not contend that material power ceases to matter in a legal context, or that international law operates independent of political, economic and social forces in the international system. As the case study shows, the US deployed coercion alongside its discursive claims, and these tactics in combination did achieve a largely favourable outcome initially. Yet US material power-whether alone or in concert with argumentation-was not decisive in the immunities debates, as other states did not accept the full range of US demands despite extensive pressure. Rather, the adoption of an argumentative frame based in law transformed the resulting diplomacy in ways that the United States could not fully control and that ultimately led to outcomes that were successively further from the initial US position. The self-interested use of law thus cut both ways, as the strategy exposed US diplomats to countervailing arguments that progressively focused around an interpretation of how the ICC-especially in Article 16-related to wider principles of criminal accountability and the role of the UNSC in global order.
This foreclosed certain types of claims that could no longer be squared with these standards, thereby narrowing the range of subsequent policy options available to US diplomats.
Material resources were therefore constrained by the parameters of acceptable legal argumentation that in turn provided a resource for other, less powerful actors to counter US coercion via alternative claims and without corresponding material capabilities. ICC proponents successfully reconstructed the terms of the debate to emphasize the Rome Statute as the sine qua non for assessing an acceptable argument. In this specialized context, US claims were judged as not being sufficiently in conformance with the prevailing legal criteria by most states engaged in the discussions. This did not prevent concessions to US power in the form of Resolutions 1422
and 1487, but it did ensure both that the resolutions were more limited than American officials had demanded and that subsequent debates would continue to take place on the terms of the Rome Statute. Thus even a dominant military power like the United States can face consequences when its behaviour is judged to contradict community standards. These forms of constraint are a crucial part of the story that would be obscured if focusing on American material preponderance in isolation. In these respects the ICC has proven more resilient than many would have anticipated, and this is particularly surprising given the scepticism that the Court could exert influence in the face of sustained US pressure. use of threats or incentives, and the deployment of material power resources has different-and more modest-effects than it would outside an argumentative and especially legal context.
Hence one important way that law matters in international relations is by providing an alternative environment in which the self-interested pursuit of policy goals may develop, which in turn sheds light on the power of legal argumentation in world politics.
